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A Supplement Instead of a
Completion
Lucia Santaella
1 The thesis defended in Giovanni Maddalena’s book, The Philosophy of Gesture. Completing
Pragmatists’ Incomplete Revolution,1 is that the pragmatist project represents a sound way to
face the Kantian dilemmas. However, this project was incomplete and to overcome this
gap, the author builds the concept of “complete gesture,” based more particularly on the
phenomenology and semiotics of C. S. Peirce. In addition to being well-built, the concept
is inspiring, and this is clearly demonstrated in its applications in the fields of identity,
creativity,  morality,  and education.  However,  I  find it  difficult  to accept Maddalena’s
finding that the Peircean project is incomplete, and I will try to provide some arguments
to support this contention. My arguments take as their starting point the fact that, to
fully understand Peirce’s mature pragmatism, one must take into thorough account that
it  only  makes  sense  in  its  connection  to  his  normative  sciences:  logic,  ethics,  and
aesthetics (CP 8.255, EP2: 334-5).
2 The concern with ethics occupied Peirce’s entire life. However, until the end of the 1880s,
he failed to consider ethics as a theoretical science, but only as an art or a practical
science. This consideration has changed, on the one hand, because his logic of relatives
led him to the conclusion that logic is not self-sufficient. On the other hand, when trying
to distinguish pure ethics from morality, he saw the importance of theoretical ethics, and
began to suspect a much deeper connection between ethics and logic. In reviewing his
pragmatism of 1877-78, Peirce emphasized the role of self-control in logical thinking,
postulating, in 1901, that ethics is the foundation of logic. A year later, he would posit
that ethics, in turn, is based on aesthetics, this fitting the search of the supreme ideal,
summum bonum of human life.
3 With the normative sciences, Peirce was rethinking the aims, purposes, values, goals and
ideals that attract and guide our deliberate conduct. Although he used the traditional
names, aesthetics, ethics and logic, Peirce sought to give them original meanings. For
him, logic takes care of reasoning as a deliberate activity, aiming to discriminate good
and bad ways of thinking.  It  critically establishes the rules that must be followed by
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reason, but it needs to appeal to the purpose or goal that justifies these rules. “Logic is
the study of the means to achieve the goal of thought, but it is ethics that defines the
goal” (CP 2.198). The fundamental problem of ethics is not what is right or wrong, but
what we are deliberately prepared to accept as an affirmation of what we should do, of
what we have in view, of what we seek. Where should the force and effort of our will be
directed to? To find out what would be the nature of this seduction or ultimate force of
attraction in its purity is what Peirce came to regard as the purpose of aesthetics.
4 Thus,  the  indissoluble  links  between  the  three  normative  sciences  are  expressed  as
follows: human action is reasoned action, which, in turn, is deliberate and controlled. But
all deliberate and controlled action is guided by purposes, goals, which, in turn, should be
chosen. This choice also, if the result of reason must be deliberate and controlled, which,
after all, requires the recognition of something that is admirable in itself to be desired.
Logic as the study of correct reasoning is the science of the means to act reasonably.
Ethics helps and guides logic by examining the purposes for which those ends should be
addressed. Finally, aesthetics guides ethics since it defines the nature of an end in itself
that is admirable and desirable in all circumstances regardless of any other consideration
of any kind whatsoever. Ethics and logic are therefore specifications of aesthetics. Ethics
proposes what purposes should reasonably be chosen under various circumstances, while
logic suggests what means are available to pursue these purposes.
5 The ideal that Peirce had in mind is the ultimate end toward which human effort must be
directed. This is the most supreme ideal on which our desire, will and sentiments should
be focused. The ideal of the ideal, the summum bonum, which needs no justification and
explanation.  What  could  be  this  goal  that,  without  ignoring  that  the  outside  world
produces inevitable interferences in the agent’s mind and will, still incorporates the free
development of the agent at the same time that ensures that this freedom will not be
troubled by unpredictable and unavoidable events in the long run? Furthermore, and
most importantly, the quality that attracts the agent’s free development should be the
counterpart of an overall aesthetic quality whose other side is the ultimate action that
experience exerts on him/her.
6 The critical review of pragmatism had led Peirce to consider, first, that the pragmatic
ideal should not satisfy the desires of any particular individual, but had to face collective
human  purposes.  To  answer  this  demand  and  fulfill  the  requirement  of  being  a
completely  satisfying  goal,  the  ideal  should be  evolutionary,  with  its  complete
significance  located  in  the  distant  future  always  concretely  postponed.  An  ideally
thinkable future, but materially unattainable because only asymptotically approachable.
Pragmatism had discovered that, in the process of evolution, that which exists, more and
more, embodies certain classes of ideals that in the course of development show to be
reasonable.  This  ideal  was  then  characterized  as  “the  continual  increase  of  the
embodiment of the idea potentiality” (MS 283: 103; EP2: 388, 1906).
7 As I have already explained some years ago (2001: 197-8), within our minds, ideas are
transmitted from one point to another in time by means of thought, that is, by means of
immaterial or imaginary signs, as Kent (1987: 158) prefers to call them. But ideas are not
yet embodied thoughts, they are “some potentiality, some form, which may be embodied
in external or in internal signs” (MS 283: 4). Moreover, the aim of the sign can only be
accomplished in the growth of the idea’s potentiality, when its embodiment occurs not
only by means of  symbols but also through actions,  habits and changes of  habits.  In
potentiality there is firstness; in the embodiment in signs, there is secondness; and in the
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idea there is thirdness, the principle of continuity. The three together compose what
Peirce  began  to  consider  as  the  aesthetic  summum  bonum,  which  coincides  with  the
ultimate pragmatist ideal: the growth of concrete reasonableness. This ideal should take
into consideration the role of self-control in the acquisition of new habits as the method
through which the pragmatic ideal may be attained.
8 Since reason is the only quality which is freely developed through the human activity of
self-control, in other words, as the essence of rationality is in self-criticism and hetero-
criticism, Peirce identified the aesthetic ideal, the ultimate ideal of pragmaticism, with
the  growth  of  concrete  reasonableness.  It  cannot  be  confused  either  with  abstract
reasonableness lost in the fog of incorporeal ideals, or with static reasonableness, which,
like  everything  that  is  static,  ends  up  in  oppression.  On  the  contrary,  it  means
reasonableness in constant development,  in process,  and in transformation.  The only
thing  that  is  desirable  without  any  ulterior  reason,  at  any  time  and  in  any  place
whatsoever, is to present ideas that are reasonable. Hence we are responsible for the
achievement and enlargement of concrete reasonableness; it is by means of our embodied
feelings, deeds, and thoughts that reason becomes concrete, heading toward an open end
whose destiny we are unable to know in advance.
9 Reasonableness has no similarity with any form of rationalism, since it refers to a kind of
rationality which embodies elements of  action and feeling,  and incorporates all  their
mixtures which appear in affection, pleasure, wish, will, desire, commotion, and emotion.
Peirce was conscious that there is no a priori guarantee that the aesthetic ideal can be
attained. The only rule of ethics is to adhere to the ideal and to expect that it can be
approached gradually and in a long course of time (Bernstein 1990).  Since deliberate
conduct is conduct guided by the aesthetic ideal, human thoughts, actions and feelings
should  be  evaluated  in  terms  of  their  contribution  to  the  growth  of  concrete
reasonableness in the world (Curley 1969: 103-4). Concrete indicates that reasonableness
may be gradually updated by means of our resolute effort toward favoring its growth.
This effort is ethical. It is the way by which the goal of the aesthetic ideal is materialized.
Likewise, logic is the means through which the ethical goal is embodied (Santaella 1994).
10 As  far  as  I  can  see,  this  development  of  Peirce’s  pragmaticism  does  not  match
Maddalena’s statement that in the Monist series (1905-06), Peirce “tried in vain to fully
explain” the order that he had in mind (32). It is also dismissive of Maddalena’s claim that
Peirce  did  not  complete  the  view  that  “ethics  and  aesthetics  judge  reality  from  a
cognitive point of view” (138).
11 Unlike this gap, Maddalena is much closer to Peirce than he imagines, when he builds the
concept of complete gesture as “any perfomed act with a beginning and an end that
carries a meaning” (69), and when he states that complete gestures follow
the  admirable  ideal  to  the  extent  that  they  help  any  particular  to  achieve  the
meaning of its own continuum of tradition and purpose. But the real aim of any
complete gesture is to push any particular to fit, and thereby to help grow reality as
such, passing from embodiment to embodiment, which are the different steps of
our synthetic comprehension of reality. (101)
12 From this, what I can conclude is that Maddalena’s argumentative trajectory to reach his
conclusions,  although  inspired  by  Peirce,  is  distinct  from  the  path  used  by  Peirce.
However, the conclusions to which they arrive are very similar. Hence instead of filling
Peirce’s  incompleteness,  Maddalena,  in  fact,  found  a  different  route  with  precious
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applications to enrich our understanding of pragmaticism and its extreme relevance to
the contemporary ethical debate.
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1. All references, if not otherwise noted, will be to Maddalena 2015.
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